Online radicalization is becoming faster, younger and less ideologically coherent. Can anything be done?

The suspected Islamist attack near Berlin’s Pride celebration was not merely another entry in Europe’s grim record of vehicle attacks. It may also represent the changing face of online radicalization: younger, faster, more decentralized and increasingly detached from any coherent political or religious doctrine.

The 21-year-old suspect was hardly invisible to German authorities. He had reportedly distributed ISIS propaganda, attempted to travel abroad to join the terrorist organization, spent time in prison and been officially classified as a potential security threat. Yet he was released while participating in the earliest stages of a deradicalization program.

That failure will understandably provoke questions about Germany’s courts, intelligence services and willingness to incapacitate known extremists. But the wider problem extends far beyond one suspect or one country.

European authorities are increasingly encountering young people whose radicalization does not follow the old pattern. They do not necessarily spend years studying an ideology, joining an organization or receiving training from an established terrorist network. Instead, they move through a chaotic online environment of propaganda videos, violent memes, conspiracy theories, private chat groups, gaming culture and communities built around grievance and notoriety.

Some embrace Islamist extremism. Others gravitate toward neo-Nazism, misogyny, nihilism or fantasies of mass violence. Increasingly, the categories overlap.

The ideology may be shallow, contradictory or almost incidental. What matters is the emotional promise: You are not powerless. You are not alone. Your anger proves that you understand what others cannot. Violence will transform you from an ignored outsider into someone feared and remembered.

That is why removing individual pieces of content, while necessary, cannot solve the problem by itself.

The internet does not invent every grievance, mental-health crisis or fascination with violence. It does, however, make it easier for vulnerable people to locate one another, reinforce their resentments and enter communities where cruelty becomes entertainment and violence becomes a source of status.

Algorithms can accelerate this process, although they are not magical mind-control devices. Most people who encounter extremist content do not become terrorists. Many users actively seek out increasingly radical material. But platforms designed to maximize attention often reward anger, fear and humiliation — the same emotions extremist recruiters exploit.

Governments and technology companies should be highly concerned. They should also avoid the tempting conclusion that sweeping censorship or universal access to private communications will make the danger disappear.

The most effective response will have to be layered.

Platforms should rapidly remove direct terrorist recruitment, attack instructions, manifestos and livestreamed violence. They should prevent known material from being endlessly reuploaded, limit automated propaganda networks and stop recommending graphic extremist content to minors. Private messaging from unknown adults to children should be restricted, and credible threats should be escalated to trained human reviewers.

Governments should focus on behavior rather than unpopular beliefs. Watching radical videos is not the same as preparing an attack. Attempting to obtain weapons, selecting targets, conducting reconnaissance, threatening identifiable people or trying to join a terrorist organization is different.

That distinction is essential to preserving freedom while protecting the public.

Deradicalization programs also have a role, especially for young people who have not crossed into violence. But counseling cannot become a substitute for imprisonment when someone has already demonstrated both intent and capability. Rehabilitation may be possible, but public safety must come first.

The Berlin suspect had allegedly moved well beyond online posturing. Authorities knew he had tried to join ISIS. They knew he had distributed its propaganda. They considered him capable of serious violence.

The internet may have helped shorten his path from extremist fantasy to real-world action. But the final institutional failure occurred offline.

Online radicalization cannot be eliminated entirely. It can be slowed, disrupted and prevented from becoming violence. That requires better technology, better intervention and, when the warning signs become unmistakable, the courage to act on what authorities already know.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)